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ARGUMENT 
I. FILINGS DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS FOR SUSTAINING THE 
DISTRCT COURT'S PRIORITY DETERMINATIONS BASED ON OTHER 
THAN STATUTORY RECORDING ORDER ALL FAIL 
There is no dispute that none of the Filing Defendants1 recorded any documents 
relating to any of their respective interests sought to be foreclosed in this case until after 
the Pioneer Trust Deeds were recorded, and that some of them never recorded at all. The 
core issue in this appeal, therefore, is whether the District Court erred in failing to declare 
the Pioneer Trust Deeds prior and superior to all Filing Defendants' claimed interests, 
based on the order of recording, and by instead granting summary judgment declaring the 
Pioneer Trust Deeds were junior and subordinate to the interests of the Filing Defendants 
based on factors other than order of recording. For each of the reasons discussed below, 
the District Court erred, and this Court should reverse the District Court and declare 
Pioneer is entitled to a judgment of priority as a matter of law. 
A. The District Court Erred in Imposing Constructive Inquiry Notice, As 
a Matter of Law and Because There Were Disputes of Material Facts 
Filing Defendants debate whether constructive inquiry notice is an exception to 
recording order priority under the recording statutes, or whether inquiry notice analysis is 
a part of ascertaining whether one is a good faith or bona fide purchaser entitled to the 
protection of the recording statutes. In this case, however, that is a distinction without a 
difference. Regardless of how or when one arrives at the inquiry notice issue raised by 
Capitalized terms used throughout this brief shall have the same meanings set forth in 
Pioneer's opening brief to this Court, unless otherwise stated. 
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Filing Defendants, the analysis is the same. The District Court erred in conducting that 
analysis, and its ruling imposing inquiry notice is unsustainable. 
This Court has repeatedly unanimously confirmed that to be subjected to a duty to 
inquire outside of or beyond county records, and potentially be precluded from or 
otherwise deprived of priority under or protection of the recording statutes, "a person 
must have '[actual] knowledge of certain facts and circumstances that are sufficient to 
give rise to a duty to inquire further.55' Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26, % 14, 254 P.3d 
171, 176 (quoting First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 
1988)) (emphasis added) (alteration in Haik); see also e.g., Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 
UT 133, f^ 31, 63 P.3d 721, 730 (explaining inquiry notice is imputed in certain cases 
where "the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts ... should impart to him, or 
lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact5") (quoting J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d at 837) 
(emphasis added). 
The primary and fatal failing in the District Court's analysis, and in the Filing i 
Defendants' arguments to sustain it, is in identifying the facts and circumstances 
purportedly actually known to Pioneer and claimed to have given rise to a duty for 
Pioneer to inquire further. The facts and circumstances relied upon by the District Court 
2
 Defendants' Jensens and Taylors dispute the requirement to show actual knowledge, 
arguing that inquiry notice "seems to focus on the objective 'reasonable person' and what < 
was reasonable inquiry under the circumstances." (Jensen and Taylor Brief, pp. 20-21). 
But as shown by the language of that quote itself, their analysis actually has to do with 
the second part of inquiry notice analysis, i.e., what inquiries are required once one is 
determined to have a duty to inquire. That is a completely separate issue from the first 
required part of inquiry notice analysis, i.e., the threshold issue of whether one has a duty i 
to inquire to begin with, which as noted in the main text above can arise only based on 
actual knowledge of certain facts. 
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and argued by Filing Defendants either do not support imposing a duty to inquire, or 
there were disputes of those claimed material facts and circumstances precluding the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment based upon them, or both. 
1. Recorded development documents, other peoples' recorded 
leases, and the "subject to" language of the deeds to the grantors 
of Pioneer's Trust Deeds. 
The District Court and the Filing Defendants all reasoned that Pioneer had a duty 
to inquire about unrecorded interests in the Property because there were various recorded 
documents going back to 1988 showing the Property drawn out essentially as a 
subdivision of numerous RV pads and campsites, recorded Articles of Incorporation and 
Bylaws of a members' association (collectively, the "Development Documents"), as 
well as recordings of various leasehold claims and related interests of various people 
other than the Filing Defendants in various lots or parcels within the Property. They also 
point to the language in the deeds to the grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds as imposing 
inquiry notice because those deeds say they are "subject to" various interests "of record". 
As a matter of law, however, those factors do not give rise to inquiry notice. This Court 
has confirmed that "inquiry notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and 
circumstances, not from records." Haik, 2011 UT 26, Tf 15 n.14, 254 P.3d 171 (quoting 
J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d at 838) (emphasis added). See also Argument LB. below. 
2. Claimed uses and improvements, and Pioneer's site visit 
The District Court and the Filing Defendants also all reasoned that Pioneer was 
placed on a duty to inquire about possible unrecorded interests in the Property because 
various people had made use of or improvements to their respective RV pad sites within 
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the Property before the last two of Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded in August of 
2001, and because a visit to the Property by Pioneer's principal, Ralph Call, in April 2001 
purportedly gave Pioneer actual knowledge of various such claimed uses and 
improvements. That ruling, however, must be reversed because there were disputes of 
the material facts on which that ruling was premised, and because even if not disputed the 
facts were insufficient as a matter of law to impose inquiry notice. 
r The District Court itself expressly acknowledged that "Plaintiff disputes that it had 
inquiry notice of the existence of the purported improvements and disputed any actual 
knowledge of these claimed improvements." (Initial Decision at R.4381 (emphasis 
added), Addendum 1). It was therefore inappropriate for the District Court to grant 
summary judgment for Defendants over those disputed facts. 
Filing Defendants seek to uphold summary judgment arguing the acknowledged 
disputes as to the claimed uses and improvements, and as to which of them Pioneer's 
principal Ralph Call saw on his April 2001 site visit are immaterial in light of the District < 
Court's conclusion that "[e]ven the minimal improvements Mr. Call states he observed 
would put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part." {Id. 
i 
at R.4383). That ruling, however, and the Filing Defendants' argument as to materiality 
of the disputed facts, is erroneous. 
To begin with, this Court has recently confirmed unequivocally that inquiry notice 
is premised upon and requires that a person have actual knowledge of facts claimed to 
give rise to any duty to inquire further, as discussed above. Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 
26, f 15 n.14, 254 P.3d 171 ("Inquiry notice is not an issue in this case because the Haik 
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Parties did not have actual knowledge of any facts ... giving rise to a duty to inquire 
further") (emphasis added). So the acknowledged dispute as to what purported 
improvements Pioneer had actual knowledge of is material and itself requires reversal of 
summary judgment. 
Additionally, the minimal improvements Mr. Call acknowledged seeing were only 
"[a]t most... four or five recreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots ... a 
few concrete slabs in scattered places where the snow had melted ... a lodge on the 
property, and some small, narrow roads." (October 2006 Affidavit of Ralph Call, at 
R.4250, Addendum 15). Those few improvements on the entire 40-acre Property are 
consistent with what one would expect to see on a property of this nature, being 
developed, as it was, as an RV park. As a matter of law, therefore, it does not excite or 
give rise to any need or duty to inquire. That is because the foundation for imposing the 
legal fiction of inquiry notice is that a party has actual knowledge of facts or 
circumstances that are out of the ordinary for or inconsistent with what one would expect 
given the nature of the property, the state of record title, or the transaction at issue. It is 
the aberrant nature of some known fact that could alert a prudent person to the need to 
inquire further about them. If one has no actual knowledge of any suspicious, aberrant, 
out of the ordinary, or inconsistent facts or circumstances, there is nothing to alert one to 
any need of further inquiry and therefore no basis to charge one with a duty to inquire 
further. See e.g., Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc, 739 
P.2d 1133, 1137 & n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (noting it is "suspicious" circumstances that 
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call for inquiry, and that even "a duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively 
investigate, and set straight"). 
Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1987) is instructive. In that case, the 
plaintiffs purchased two rental houses, but failed to record their deeds. Thereafter, their 
seller obtained a nonowner occupied loan which it secured by trust deeds on those same 
houses. The lender recorded its trust deeds. The plaintiffs then sued their seller's 
subsequent lender to quiet title. The plaintiffs argued since the lender's appraiser had 
inspected the two homes prior to the closing of the loan, and therefore had knowledge 
that renters were occupying the premises, the lender had a duty to inquire as to the 
identity of the landlord and thus should be charged with inquiry notice that plaintiffs were 
the true owners. Id. at 821. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected that argument, because 
"there was nothing about the property that would have alerted [Lender] to the ownership 
of plaintiffs. The appraiser expected to find, and did find, persons occupying the 
premises as tenants." Id. at 822. Since the known facts and circumstances were not out 
of the ordinary for or inconsistent with the contemplated transaction, the lender was not 
charged with any duty inquire beyond the record, and the lender's subsequently-executed 
but first-recorded trust deeds were held to have priority over the purchasers' earlier but 
unrecorded interests. 
Based primarily upon Mathis v. Madsen, 261 P.2d 952 (Utah 1953) and Meagher 
v. Dean, 91 P.2d 454 (Utah 1939), Filing Defendants attempt to argue there is a blanket 
rule that their possession by itself gives rise to a duty to inquire as to their claims or 
interests. But both of those cases involved possession by someone out of the ordinary 
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from or inconsistent with what one would have expected given the facts and transactions 
there at issue. Neither they, nor any other of the authorities cited by Filing Defendants 
undermine the law that inquiry notice can arise only if one has knowledge of facts or 
circumstances that are suspicious, out of the ordinary, or inconsistent with what one 
would expect in a given case. 
The minimal improvements Ralph Call saw during his site visit in April of 2001, 
and for that matter all of the purported use and improvement facts discussed by the 
District Court were, consistent with what one would have expected to see - use of the 
Property as an RV park, which is precisely what the Property was being developed to be. 
There was nothing suspicious or out of the ordinary. As a matter of law, therefore, such 
facts simply could not give rise to any duty to inquire further looking for unrecorded 
interests in the Property. 
3. The appraisal. 
The District Court and the Filing Defendants also claimed Pioneer had actual 
knowledge of various leasehold interests of the Filing Defendants and otherwise, giving a 
duty to inquire further about other leaseholds, purportedly based on Pioneer having an 
appraisal report referring to various leaseholds. As shown in its opening brief to this 
Court, however, Pioneer disputed below, and still disputes, that it had actual knowledge 
of any leaseholds or other interests in the Property when it made its loans, including from 
or based on the referenced appraisal. Indeed, Pioneer disputed and denied ever having 
seen any but the first two pages of the appraisal, without all of the lease information and 
other detail Filing Defendants and the District Court referred to and relied upon as the 
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basis for a purported duty to inquire further. (E.g., Pioneer's opening brief to this Court, 
pp. 18-19). That dispute of fact material to the District Court's summary judgment ruling 
requires reversal. 
Filing Defendants now attempt to downplay the significance of the appraisal 
report to the District Court's analysis, arguing it is irrelevant whether Pioneer actually 
read or reviewed the appraisal report, and that all the District Court held matters is that 
Pioneer had "access" to the appraisal. (E.g., Jensen and Taylor Brief, p. 22; Anderson 
Defendants' Brief, pp. 41-43). Even if that were the case, it would merely confirm the 
District Court's ruling should be reversed because, as shown above, a person must have 
actual knowledge of certain facts in order to be held to a duty to inquire further, and 
inquiry notice does not arise from records to which one merely "has access". E.g., Haik 
v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26, 254 P.3d 171. 
B. The Andersen Defendants Incorrectly Claim Pioneer Did Not Appeal 
Constructive Record Notice; The District Court Erred in Imposing 
Any Constructive Record Notice As a Matter of Law 
The Anderson Defendants (only) argue this Court should uphold the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on the premise that Pioneer did not appeal the 
District Court's statement that Pioneer had constructive record notice of the Andersen 
Defendants' respective interests in the Property. (Anderson Defendants' Brief, p. 24). 
That is simply untrue. Constructive record notice has been part and parcel of the 
arguments and analysis throughout this case, including in Pioneer's opening brief to this 
Court. The Anderson Defendants acknowledge the only things cited by the District Court 
in support for its constructive record notice ruling were the recorded Development 
4817-3151-4378 g I 
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Documents, various other peoples' recorded interests (admittedly none belonging to any 
of the defendants/appellees herein), and the language in the deeds to the grantors of 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds indicating those deeds were "subject to [certain interests] of 
record". (Anderson Defendants' Brief, pp. 22-23).3 The other Filing Defendants also 
point to those things as the only support for any purported constructive record notice. 
Pages 30 through 34 of Pioneer's opening brief to this Court discuss at length the 
error of the District Court's record notice ruling based on general Development 
Documents and other peoples' recorded interests, including seeking reversal because: 
The District Court's ruling that documents recorded to dedicate the 
Property as an RV park, the recorded plat of the RV park, and the 
various recorded leases on various of the RV sites (none of which are the 
Filing Defendants' leases on their claimed RV sites) somehow gives rise 
to a legal duty of lenders like Pioneer to inquire further than and outside 
the documents of record to determine who else may own or claim any 
interests in the other RV parks or lots within the Property development 
not reflected in the recorded documents is illogical and unsustainable. 
[Pioneer's opening Brief, p. 31 (emphases in original)]. 
Certain of the Filing Defendants also cited as a part of their "record notice" argument a 
September 2000 letter and an October 2000 sale agreement that were also cited by the 
District Court. They claim those documents show that Parcel -025 purportedly was not to 
be transferred to the trustor of Pioneer's Trust Deeds. There is no claim, however, that 
those documents were recorded, so there items do not impose any purported record 
notice. Nor has there ever been any claim that Pioneer had actual knowledge of those 
documents, so they would not fit any inquiry notice or actual notice analysis either. 
Moreover, and in any event, whatever those documents showed or said with regard to an 
intent to sell Parcel -025 in the year 2000 was indisputably replaced and superseded by 
the later Purchase and Sale Agreement dated June 5, 2001, which expressly did include 
Parcel -025 in the list of properties being sold to Pine Ridge. A copy of the June 5, 2001 
Purchase and Sale Agreement was attached as Exhibit 7 to one of the Filing Defendants' 
summary judgment memorandum below, at R.3747-R.3751, and a copy is attached hereto 
as Addendum 1). 
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The Filing Defendants fail to explain how recorded general Development 
Documents and documents recorded as to various individual leasehold claims on various 
individual lots (admittedly not any of the interests of the Filing Defendants Pioneer seeks 
to foreclose) could somehow give notice to lenders like Pioneer of the existence of other 
unrecorded interests. By statute the duty is to protect one's self by recording. Utah Code 
§ 57-3-102(3). This Court has long recognized "[t]he salutariness of [Utah's] recording 
statute is that it provides stability and certainty to land titles" upon which parties must be 
able to rely. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1988). 
This Court should therefore reject Filing Defendants' arguments, and any District Court 
ruling, that the noted recorded documents of other parties in the abstract somehow give 
notice of Filing Defendants' unrecorded interests. 
Pioneer also has appealed the only other purported basis of record notice, the 
District Court's construction of the "subject to" language in the deeds to the grantors of 
two of Pioneer's Trust Deeds. (E.g., Pioneer's opening brief, pp. 38-39). Pioneer \ 
showed that since the deeds said they were "subject to" certain interests "of record," as a 
matter of law those deeds, and Pioneer's Trust Deeds, gave notice only of possible 
interests that are "of record," and not of any Filing Defendants' non-record claims and 
interests. (Id.). 
Filing Defendants respond that "of record" modified and applied only to the last 1 
item in the list preceding those words in the deeds, relying on the "last antecedent" rule. 
But when interpreting a deed of conveyance, the plain and ordinary meaning is 
paramount. See, Panos v. Olsen & Assoc. Const., Inc., 2005 UT App 446, ^  15, 123 P.3d 
4817-3151-4378 \Q
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816. "[H]elpfiil as rules of construction often are, they are useful guides, but poor 
masters; and they should not be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force 
of law, or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977). A plain and ordinary reading of the deeds to the 
grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds shows the property was conveyed subject only to 
certain listed items "of record" and therefore put Pioneer on notice only of those interests 
that were actually recorded.4 Reading the modifier "of record" as modifying the entire 
list of "subject to" items is the natural reading. 
Contrary to Filing Defendants' arguments, this Court has explained, "the so called 
iast antecedent5 rule is not necessarily limited to [modification of] the one term 
immediately preceding [the modifier];" rather, "if there are several preceding terms of the 
same character, it may modify all of such terms, if the natural and sensible meaning of 
the wording so requires." Salt Lake City, 568 P.2d at 741. The Court in Salt Lake City 
was presented with the following phrase: 
The state and county officers mentioned in this title shall not in any case 
perform any official service unless the fees prescribed for such service are 
paid in advance,. . . provided, that no fees shall be charged the state, or any 
county or subdivision thereof, or any public officer acting therefor . . . 
Id. at 740 (emphasis added). The Court held that the phrase "or subdivision thereof 
modified both "county" and "state". Id. at 741; see also, LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 
4
 The deeds both state the property is conveyed to the parties who in turn signed 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds "[s]ubject to all declarations, covenants, conditions and 
restrictions, certificate of beneficial use, regulations, canals, greenbelt provisions, 
easements, declarations, agreements, memberships, leases and right of ways of record." 
(Addenda 10 and 11). 
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UT 41, f 15, 215 P.3d 135 ("the rule of the last antecedent... does not prevent us from 
deciding that qualifying words and phrases apply to 'several preceding terms of the same 
character.5") (quoting Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, If 10, 976 P.2d 1202).5 
It is logical and natural to read "of record" in the Pine Ridge Deed as a modifier of 
the entire list. The deeds therefore expressly gave constructive record notice to Pioneer 
only of the interests that were "of record," and not of any of the Filing Defendants' 
admittedly unrecorded interests. 
C. The Andersen Defendants Incorrectly Claim Pioneer Did Not Appeal 
Actual Notice; The District Court Erred in Imposing Any Actual 
Notice, As a Matter of Law and Because There Were Disputes of Facts 
The Anderson Defendants (only) argue this Court should uphold the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on the premise that Pioneer did not appeal the 
District Court's statement that Pioneer had actual notice of the Anderson Defendants' 
claimed interests. (Anderson Defendants' Brief, pp. 20-21). That is simply untrue. 
Actual notice was part and parcel of the arguments and analysis throughout this case, 
including in Pioneer's opening Brief to this Court. The only asserted factual bases upon 
Fatal to their argument, Appellees in their own briefs cite and rely upon the case 
of Arnold Indus., Inc. v. LoveError! Bookmark not defined., in which the phrase 
"Subject to: ... Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way, Easements, Leases 
and Reservations now of Record" was analyzed and the modifier "of record" applied to 
the entire list, making the conveyance "subject to any right-of-way 'now of Record," 
even though "right-of-way" was not the last antecedent. 2002 UT 133, ffl[ 6, 12 & 28, 63 
P.3d 721. That also is how Appellees in their briefing read the phrase "Minor 
typographical or clerical errors" in the corrective affidavit statute - they instinctively, 
without even recognizing the contradiction with their other arguments, read "minor" as 
modifying both "typographical" and "clerical errors." See e.g., Jensen & Taylor Brief at 
24 ("the omission of an entire parcel . . . was not the minor clerical error the legislature 
had in mind ..."). 
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which the District Court made any statement as to purported actual notice are "the 
undisputed recorded documents, improvements to the Property ... and other factors." 
(January 2009 Judgment and Order, f 18 at R.4915 & R.5425 - included as a part of 
Addendum 4). The only "other factors" the District Court ever identified in that regard 
were, in its Initial Decision (the May 10, 2007 Memorandum Decision cited in the 
introductory paragraph of the January 2009 Judgment and Order): again, recorded 
Development Documents and recorded documents regarding other peoples' individual 
interests, claimed use of and improvements to various lots purportedly seen on Pioneer's 
April 2001 site visit, the appraisal, and the "subject to [certain interests] of record" deed 
language. (Initial Decision at R.4370-77, R.4381 & R. 4384; Addendum No. 1). All of 
those purported "actual notice" facts have been and are being appealed by Pioneer, 
including without limitation as having been disputed by Pioneer in the District Court 
below and therefore precluding the grant of summary judgment to Filing Defendants 
which Pioneer asks this Court to reverse. By this reference Pioneer incorporates as 
though fully set forth here the facts and analyses relating to purported actual notice set 
forth in Pioneer's opening brief to this Court, including pages 17-21 and 30-38, and all 
parts of this Reply Brief further addressing each and any of the purported "actual notice" 
facts. Actual notice has been and remains a subject of this appeal, including based on 
disputes of facts material to any determination of actual notice as shown in the above-
referenced and incorporated portions of this Reply Brief and Pioneer's opening brief. 
D. Filing Defendants' "Wild Deed'5 Arguments Are Without Merit 
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Filing Defendants each also argue that Pioneer is not entitled to protection under 
Utah's recording statutes as to Parcel -025. They admit that Pioneer's Modified Trust 
Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed both were recorded and that they both 
expressly list and describe Parcel -025. But they argue those were "wild deeds" because 
the grantor, Pine Ridge, did not own Parcel -025 as a matter of record when it signed 
them. Filing Defendants therefore argue Pioneer's interests in Parcel -025 should not be 
deemed to arise for priority purposes until either: (i) September 24, 2002, when the Filing 
Defendants admit the Corrective Affidavit was recorded, expressly and unequivocally 
stating that Parcel -025 "was included in the transaction . . . and should have been 
included in the legal description attached to" the deed to Pine Ridge, or (ii) in 2005 when 
Filing Defendants admit the Settlement Deed was recorded which expressly and 
unequivocally conveyed Parcel -025 to Pine Ridge as a matter of record. Copies from the 
record below of the Corrective Affidavit and of the Settlement Deed are Addenda 12 & 
13 submitted with Pioneer's opening brief to this Court. 
Filing Defendants' "wild deed" arguments are wholly ineffectual in light of the 
dispositive after-acquired title statute cited in Pioneer's opening brief to this Court and 
undisputed (not even addressed) by any of the Filing Defendants. Pursuant to Utah's 
after-acquired title statute, since the Settlement Deed indisputably transferred title to Pine 
Ridge, Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed that were 
both signed by Pine Ridge, are deemed automatically and by operation of law valid and 
effective liens and encumbrances against Parcel -025 as of the dates they were recorded 
"as if [Parcel -025 had been] acquired before execution of the trust deed." Utah Code 
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Ann. § 57-1-20 (2006) (emphasis added). None of the "wild deed" cases cited by Filing 
Defendants was an after-acquired title case nor dealt with or addressed the after-acquired 
title statute. Each of those cases, and the entirety of Filing Defendants' "wild deed5' 
analysis, is therefore wholly off-point and ineffectual to this case. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ERRED IN HANDLING THE 
REMAINING ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The District Court Erred in Its Handling of the Corrective Affidavit. 
Filing Defendants argue that the Corrective Affidavit (which clarified of record 
that the Pine Ridge Deed included Parcel -025) was ineffective and because an omission 
of one of several parcels from a legal description is not a "minor" error. 
The Utah legislature has never defined or limited the phrase "minor typographical 
or clerical error" in the corrective affidavit statute, so the court must look to the plain 
language of the statute to interpret its meaning. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 
P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). By the statute's plain terms, any minor typographical or 
clerical error may be corrected by the recording of an affidavit. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-
106(9). That is precisely what happened in this case. The Corrective Affidavit stated the 
omission of Parcel -025 from the legal description attached to the Pine Ridge Deed was 
an inadvertent mistake and referenced the parties' intent to have conveyed Parcel -025, 
including as evidenced by the inclusion of Parcel -025 in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement that was executed concurrently with the Pine Ridge Deed. (Addenda 12 & 
17). 
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Contrary to the Anderson Defendants' suggestion, the fact that the Corrective 
Affidavit was recorded by a title company employee does not render it ineffective. The 
statute does not contain any limitation as to who may record a corrective affidavit. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-106(9). Rather, the fact that the incorrect deed was recorded by a 
third party who had been hired to act as clerk/scrivener for the parties to the transaction 
serves to highlight that the omission of Parcel -025 was indeed a clerical error.6 
Appellees' argument that a legal description is somehow sacrosanct and cannot be 
corrected by affidavit is unsupported and would require this court to legislate an 
6
 Filing Defendants Jensen and Taylor claim that the grantor under the Pine Ridge Deed, 
KDA, has "denied that Parcel -025 was included in the transaction." See Jensen & 
Taylor Brief at j^ 15, p. 5. Jensen & Taylor, along with the other "Budd Defendants" as 
they were known, made this claim in their summary judgment memorandum filed with 
the District Court. See R. 3690, ^ 12. They argued that the first page of the Sale 
agreement, which identified Parcel -025 as among the parcels to be conveyed, had been 
switched after signing and did not originally mention Parcel -025. Pioneer disputed those 
allegations in the summary judgment briefing to the District Court {see R. 4216-4219, 
disputing f^ 12) and still disputes them. Disputes of those claimed facts are yet another 
example of why summary judgment in this case for Filing Defendants was inappropriate 
and should be reversed. Moreover, such claims by Defendants Jensen and Taylor are 
unsupported by the cited evidence, without foundation, and contrary to recorded 
documents. The only purported evidence they cited in support of the claim was (i) their 
summary judgment Exhibit 22 (R. 3961-62), a letter from KDA's counsel to Advanced 
Title Insurance Agency; and (ii) their summary judgment Exhibit 23 (R. 3965-4006), 
transcript of the deposition of Allison Bodily. In the letter, KDA's counsel refused to 
sign a corrective deed to clarify the conveyance of Parcel -025; but, as admitted by 
Defendants Jensen & Taylor, KDA later signed a "Settlement Deed" (Addendum 13) 
which did just that - again conveying Parcel -025 to Pioneer. And while Ms. Bodily had 
historically been an officer of KDA, she never stated in any of the cited portions of her 
deposition testimony that there was any switching of any pages of the referenced 
agreement after it was signed. By her own admission, she would not have had any 
foundation or basis to so state, even if she had, since she admitted she did not know 
anything about the purchase agreement that is the subject of that testimony, had not been 
involved in the transaction for some three months prior to her father signing that 
agreement, and was not present when her father signed that agreement. (Bodily 
deposition transcript, pp. 143 (R. 3971), 145 (R. 3973), and 622 (R. 4004)). 
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unspoken exception to the corrective affidavit statute. An error in a legal description is 
no different than an error in other required aspects of a deed. While a legal description is 
a fundamental part of a deed and required before a deed may be recorded, the same is true 
of the grantee's name and address. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-105(3)(a) ("A document 
conveying title to real property . . . is entitled to be recorded . . . only if the document 
contains the names and mailing addresses of the grantees in addition to the legal 
description"). Under Appellees' interpretation, parties would not be able to correct a 
misspelled name or an error in a mailing address without re-executing and re-recording 
the instrument. Their unspoken exception would swallow the rule and render the 
corrective affidavit statute meaningless, as there would be nothing parties would be able 
to correct by affidavit. Utah courts have long treated errors in legal descriptions as mere 
"scriveners errors." See e.g., Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1980); Thornock 
v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 935 fn. 2 (Utah 1979); Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 
(Utah 1976). 
Appellees' resort to legislative history is not helpful. First, as a matter of law, 
when a statute can be understood from the plain language, the court "will not resort to 
other interpretive tools - in particular, legislative history." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2009 UT 
88, <[} 30, 225 P.3d 192 (Durham, C.J., concurring); see also, In re Adoption ofBabyE.Z., 
2011 UT 38, Tf 15, 687 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. Second, even if there were some ambiguity 
in the plain language of Utah Code § 57-3-106(9), which there is not, the legislative 
history Appellees cite does not help define the phrase "minor typographical or clerical 
errors." The deletion of the words "augmented" and "amended" from the statute in 2000 
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was not a policy decision, but simply a drafting suggestion from the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel. See Bill Drafting and Research File - Drafts, SB0215 
(2000 General Session) at page 11. The editors apparently recognized that the terms 
"augmented," "amended," and "corrected55 could all be covered in one word -
"corrected." Indeed, what little has been said of the corrective affidavit statute in the 
legislative history indicates that the legislature did not intend a narrow or constrained 
application of the statute, as espoused by Filing Defendants and the District Court, but 
rather a common sense approach to fixing simple problems, as was done with the 
Corrective Affidavit in this case. 
Finally, the Filing Defendants' arguments under the merger doctrine may not be 
used to nullify the corrective affidavit statute. See Anderson v. UPS, 2004 UT 57, f^ 12, 
96 P.3d 903 (common law must yield to statute). But, even if the merger doctrine were 
applied here, Pioneer has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Pine Ridge 
Deed mistakenly did not conform to the intent of both parties and should therefore be 
reformed. Indeed, Filing Defendants have admitted, and the District Court found, that 
that the Purchase and Sale Agreement that was executed contemporaneous with the Pine 
Ridge Deed "shows on its face that parcels -036, -037, -038, and -025 were to be 
conveyed to Pine Ridge." Initial Decision, ^ 23 (R. 4373, Addendum 1) (emphasis 
added); see also e.g., Addendum 1; Jensen & Taylor Brief at 5, ^ 14; Anderson 
Defendant's Brief at 8 (adopting facts as stated in Initial Decision). 
o 
7
 Appellees Jensen & Taylor incorrectly argued that Pioneer did not allege mutual 
mistake or reformation of the deed. See e.g., Third Amended and Supplement Complaint, 
dated 1-25-06, R. 289-291, at ffl[ 64-67, 77-79, 80-91). 
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B. The District Court Erred in Granting Priority to Claimants in the 
Payment Lots Contrary to Their Contract Language and Admissions. 
It remains undisputed that the contracts by which the various claimed "ownership" 
(actually leasehold) interests in the various Payment Lots were to be transferred (the 
"Payment Defendants' Contracts") have never been paid in full. Nor has it been 
disputed that each of those contracts states: 
3. CERTIFICATE. Buyer shall receive a certificate of ownership when 
contract is paid in ful l . . . 
See e.g., R. 4683 at \ 3, R. 4687 at f 3, and R. 4691 at Tf 3 (emphasis added). The only 
argument is whether the claimed "ownership" interests passed to the Payment Defendants 
upon their execution of the contract (followed by a certificate evidencing that interest 
upon full payment); or whether "ownership" (evidenced by a certificate) would not pass 
until full payment. 
Despite representations by the Jensen & Taylor Defendants to the contrary, the 
District Court did not rule on this issue of contract interpretation (which has been 
identified as Issue No. 5). The District Court, in a June 2, 2010 decision (R. 5288), 
denied Pioneer's motion on this issue, but inappropriately refused to interpret or apply the 
above-quoted language from the Payment Defendants' Contracts. Two months later, the 
District Court entered its findings and conclusions, determining on the basis of a lack of 
title to Parcel -025 and on the basis of actual and constructive notice, all discussed above 
in this brief, but not on the basis of any interpretation of the contract language, that the 
interests of the Payment Defendants in the Payment Lots were superior to that of 
Plaintiff. See August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots (Addendum 4, R. 5438-5442). 
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The Jensen & Taylor Defendants' assertion that the District Court "decide[d] th[is] issue 
in Jensen's favor" is therefore wholly inaccurate. (Jensen & Taylor Brief at 32). 
The District Court should have interpreted and applied the language of the 
Payment Defendants' Contracts because it is determinative of the Payment Defendants' 
priority - having never fully paid for their claimed interests in the Payment Lots, the 
Payment Defendants are not yet entitled to receive any ownership or other interest in 
those lots and their interests are therefore junior and inferior in priority to Pioneer's 
interests in the Payment Lots. The Payment Defendants' Contracts are, like the purchase 
contract at issue in Haik, executory. See, Haik, 254 P.3d at 178. In Haik, Sandy City 
entered into an agreement for the purchase of a certain water right. The language of the 
purchase agreement was unclear as to whether the terms had been fulfilled, so the court 
treated the contract as executory. But because the contract involved the conveyance of 
title, the court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and held that Sandy City had 
an equitable interest in the water right from the date of the purchase agreement. 
Nevertheless this court still held that the Plaintiff, who had recorded his deed to the same 
water right after Sandy City's purchase but before Sandy City recorded its deed, took title 
to the water right in good faith and obtained priority over Sandy City's interest. Like 
Sandy City, the Payment Defendants' contracts in this case are executory. Payment 
Defendants are in an even weaker position than Sandy City, because not only have they 
failed to fulfill their executor contracts, they are not entitled to any benefits of the 
doctrine of equitable conversion which does not apply to their leasehold interests and 
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easement interests. As a matter of law, therefore, Payment Defendants' interests will not 
pass until full payment by them, which has not yet occurred and which will therefore be 
junior and subject to Pioneer's Trust Deeds. 
Filing Defendants' plea for the fashioning of some sort of unspecified "equitable" 
interpretation of this contract provision does help their case. First, this is a lawsuit for 
foreclosure and is therefore an action at law, not an equity action. Where, as in the 
instant case, a detailed statutory scheme governs the claim at issue, resort to equity is 
precluded. Anderson, 2004 UT 57 at ffl[ 11-13; see also, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23, et 
seq., and §§ 78-37-1, et seq. (setting forth detailed statutory scheme for trust deed 
foreclosures). Additionally, since Pioneer was the non-moving party, equity and law 
would require an interpretation that favors Pioneer against Filing Defendants' summary 
judgment motions. Appellees Jensen & Taylor themselves cite to the case of Wingets, 
Inc. v. Bitters, in which the court held that on summary judgment, the non-moving party 
is "entitled to the most favorable interpretation that could be placed upon [the contract] 
language by any person of ordinary intelligence and understanding and in the light of 
8
 Equitable conversion is the concept that the "vendee of an executory land sale contract 
holds equitable ownership of the property but not legal title." Cannefax v. Clement, 818 
P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 1991). Utah courts have applied the doctrine, but only with regard 
to the sale of fee title interests. See e.g., Capital Assets Financial Svcs. v. Maxwell, 2000 
UT 9, Tf 15 (equitable conversion applies only to realty, not personalty); see also, 
STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 150:92 (2011) ("Ordinarily, a lease for a term of 
years will not work an equitable conversion of the real estate subject to the lease because 
it does not create an interest in land for the benefit of the lessee."). Since the Payment 
Defendants' interests in the Payment Lots were only leasehold interests, and did not 
involve the conveyance of fee title, the doctrine does not apply and their interests. 
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existing circumstances." 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 1972); see also e.g., Alder v. Bayer 
Corp., 2002 UT 115, fn. 13, 61 P.3d 1068 (same). 
C. Filing Defendants' References to Title Insurance Require Reversal. 
Filing Defendants Jensens and Taylors also cite references to title insurance in 
support of their arguments for constructive inquiry notice and for actual notice. They 
admit they should not have made references to Pioneer's title insurance coverage in their 
memoranda to the District court. (Jensen & Taylor Brief at 30). But they argue that it 
caused no harm to Pioneer. Id. The harm, however, was the introduction of unfair 
prejudice against Pioneer. "Prejudice" means "[t]he harm resulting from a fact-trier's 
being exposed to evidence that is persuasive but inadmissible . . . " BLACK'S 
DICTIONARY (2011). Filing Defendants Jensens and Taylors, and others who joined in 
their memoranda to the District Court, expressly argued to the District Court that 
Pioneer's "recourse lies in an action against the trustor personally, and with the title 
company who insured the property." (R.3695). They further argued: 
In the context of this case, the risks contractually assumed by the title 
insurance company must not be overlooked or ignored. Should the court 
adopt the defendants' position [on issue as to encumbrance against 
Parcel -025], then Pioneer may file a claim on the title insurance policy 
... [and] if the court adopts the defendants' position that Pioneer is not a 
BFP lender because Pioneer had actual or inquiry (constructive) notice 
of the defendants' interest in the land ... - then this was a risk that 
Advanced Title and their underwriter Attorney Title Guaranty Fund also 
congractually assumed and would be obligated to Pioneer for any loss 
suffered due to persons in actual possession of the property. Such is the 
nature of title insurance. In either event. Pioneer has a contractual 
remedy to be made whole—something the defendants do not have. 
(R.3703 (emphasis added)). 
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Contrary to Filing Defendants Jensens' and Taylors' brash suggestion (p.31, n.9), 
in arguing that Pioneer was prejudiced by references to title insurance Pioneer does not 
imply the District Court had any improper motive to intentionally commit error. Rather, 
Pioneer merely pointed out it was in fact improperly prejudiced in this case by Filing 
Defendants, because their admittedly improper references to and arguments about the 
potential loss-shifting effects of insurance coverage appear to have impacted the outcome 
of this case in which the District Court indisputably inconsistently ranked certain parties' 
priorities on order of recording while ranking others' priorities based on other factors 
discussed above in this brief. Filing Defendants can hardly be heard to complain that 
their insurance arguments had their intended effect. Nor can they cast arrows at Pioneer 
for making note that Filing Defendants' title insurance arguments had precisely the 
persuasive and prejudicial effect the collateral source is designed to prevent. See Gibbs 
M. Smith} Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997). 
Filing Defendants alternatively attempt to justify their reference to title insurance, 
and preliminary title reports, on the grounds that it was permissible to show constructive 
notice of recorded leases. {See Jensen & Taylor Brief at 30; Anderson Brief at 49). But 
title reports and policies make note only of interests that appear of record. They do not, 
therefore, give notice (actual, record, or inquiry) of unrecorded interests like those of the 
Filing Defendants. Also, as shown above, any holders of recorded leases were not sued 
in this action. 
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IV. PIONEER SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED 
ON APPEAL 
The promissory notes, for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security, 
indisputably provide that Pioneer is entitled to recover all costs and expenses of 
collection, including reasonable attorneys5 fees. This does not mean, as some of the 
Filing Defendants appear to fear, that Pioneer is seeking a money judgment for those fees 
as against the Anderson Appellees. Rather, Pioneer is merely seeking to enforce its right 
to include its attorneys' fees and collection costs in the amounts for which it is entitled to 
foreclose. Filing Defendants Jensens and Taylors argue to recover fees under the 
reciprocal fee statute. But they have no reciprocal right to recover fees against Pioneer 
because they were not parties to the promissory notes under which Pioneer seeks to 
recover fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's summary judgment rulings 
assigning priority other than by the order of recording interests. The District Court's 
decision granting priority to the interests of Filing Defendants on summary judgment 
based on other than order of recording was unsustainable on the facts of this case as a 
matter of law, and particularly on summary judgment in light of disputes of material 
facts. 
By contrast, Pioneer's Trust Deeds indisputably were recorded prior to any 
interests of any of the Filing Defendants to any part of the subject Property. As a matter 
of law, therefore, Pioneer's Trust Deeds are superior to the interests of all Filing 
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Defendants. This Court should therefore reverse the District Court, assign priority for all 
parties' claims and interests in the order of recording, and allow Pioneer to foreclose its 
Trust Deeds as prior and superior to all interests of all Defendants in and to any and all 
parts of and interests in the Property. 
,th RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29m day of September, 2011. 
Tilt 
FABIAN & CfcENDENIN, PC 
Attorneys for• Plaintiff/Appellant Pioneer 
Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. 
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PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
THIS PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is by and 
between K.D.A. Corporation ("Seller") and Pine Ridge Properties, Inc., together with 
Joseph L. Hardy and S. Denise Hardy, individually, (collectively referred to as "Buyer"), 
effective the date of execution, below. 
.1. Seller agrees to transfer and convey by warranty deed to Buyer, the real 
property located at approx. 1135 North Bear Lake Boulevard, Rich County, Utah 
84028, (parcel numbers 41-08-00-025, 41-08-00-036, 41-08-00-037, 41-08-00-038) (th 
"Subject Property"), located in Rich County, State of Utah, more particularly describee 
as: 
See Attached Exhibit aA." 
Including the right to lease 24 remaining unsold lots within parcel numbers 41-
08-00-025, (the North Half of Lot 4, adjacent to the Subject Property); together with 
the right to collect all annual dues, membership dues and other dues associated with 
existing and future leases; together with the currently existing water rights through the 
pump house attributable to such parcel; together with all contract rights of Seller to 
purchase on a right of first refusal the Leonard and Joanne Butcher parcel; and the 
right title and interest of Seller to require the lease owners to obtain approval prior to 
any construction associated with their lease property; and together with a right of 
access across said property to the Subject Property as applicable. 
Together with the right, title and interest of Seller in all RV memberships 
presently owned by Seller and associated with the above-described properties. 
2. The parties hereto agree that the Subject Property is subject to various 
exceptions appearing of record and disclosed by the attached title commitment issued 
by Advanced Title Ins. Agency, L.C. All other liens, consentual or otherwise, shall be 
removed by Seller, except as provided otherwise by this Agreement or as the same are 
of the same character as the listed exceptions and are disclosed to Buyer by the title 
company before recording. 
3. Buyer agrees to pay to Seller the sum of $2,500,000.00 as the purchase 
price of the Subject Property. In addition, Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless the Seller as against any claim of Pioneer Builders of Nevada, a Nevada 
corporation, with respect the trust deed securing the loan to United West Investment 
Group, Inc., less the sum of $411,000.00 and interest earned on the account 
maintained for Seller with respect thereto in the possession of Seller as of the date 
hereof. The $2,500,000.00 purchase price and any improvement allowance to be used 
for Buyer's benefit shall be financed through Seller financing, as directed by Seller, 
including without limitation to a 1031 exchange accomodator for Seller. The Buyer 
agrees to obtain independent financing to pay off the Seller as soon as possible, and 
certainly no later that the dates set forth in the notes provided herewith. The 
remaining amount due from Buyer shall be further secured by deeds of trust secured bv 
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the Subject Property. A breach as to the terms of any note and/or trust deed relatir 
to the Subject Property shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. All payments b 
Buyer pursuant to this paragraph 3, shall be paid by Buyer as directed by Seller, 
including the use of an escrow service if desired by Seller. Buyer agrees to be 
responsible for all charges by the escrow company reasonably anticipated by this 
Agreement or as added pursuant to the election of Seller. 
4. The parties agree that Seller shall pay all county real property taxes for t 
year 2000. Subject to the foregoing, Buyer shall pay all property taxes for the year 
2001 and as taxes and other assessments otherwise become due hereafter. Hazard 
insurance shall be purchased independently by the parties desiring insurance. 
5. The parties agree that the Buyer shall pay all closing costs as the same 
become necessary to accomplish the transactions anticipated by this Agreement. 
6. Seller agrees to deliver possession of the Subject Property to Buyer with 
24 hours of the initial settlement, which shall occur on or before June 8, 2001. Buyei 
agrees that for a period of 2 years following the date of this Agreement, Buyer will no 
raise the homeowner's dues relating to the real property and interests sold pursuant t 
this Agreement, subject to any further mutual agreement between Buyer and Seller in 
the future. 
7. An owner's policy of title insurance shall be provided at Buyer's expense, 
insuring marketable title in the Subject Property as provided by paragraphs 1 and 2 o 
this Agreement. Said title insurance shall be provided by Advanced Title Insurance 
Agency, L.C., effective the date of this Agreement, and shall be paid for at settlement 
and issued upon clearing and transfer of title to the satisfaction of the title insurance 
company. 
8. In the event that Buyer fails to comply with the payment terms describee 
by paragraph 3 of this Agreement, including without limitation the payment terms of 
the Note referenced therein, then the Seller shall have the option to: 
A. Enforce the terms of the Note and related deed of trust; or 
B. Cancel this Agreement in accordance with the following procedure. First, 
Seller shall provide 30 days notice to Buyer of Seller's intent to cancel this 
Agreement unless Buyer makes the payments due, which amount shall be 
specified in such notice. Second, Buyer agrees to deliver to Seller at the time oJ 
Closing the attached Special Warranty Deed. In the event that Buyer fails to 
make the payment required by the notice described by this paragraph, Seller 
shall have absolute right to record the Special Warranty Deed, reclaim title to 
the Subject Property, and evict Buyer. Recording of said Special Warranty Dee( 
by Seller, as permitted by this paragraph, shall be construed as a termination of 
this Agreement based on default by Buyer. Seller many elect to treat forfeiture 
of the Subject Property pursuant to the terms of the Special Warranty Deed as
 | 
a liquidated damage; or either party may bring an action for determination of 
damages (including but not limited to lost benefit of the contract, reasonable 
rents, property taxes, property damage, encumbrances, and so forth) and either 
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augmentation or refund of amounts paid to Seller at the time of Closing and/or 
pursuant to payments on the Note. 
The parties agree that the provisions of this paragraph are reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances and as of the date of this Agreement, and the parties agree tc 
hereafter execute such documents as may be reasonable or necessary to accomplish th< 
intent of this paragraph, including without limitation any waiver of objection or claim 
with respect hereto. The parties agree that to the extent that the provision of this 
paragraph may be subject to non-enforcement as a result of any punitive effect, then 
the parties shall cooperate to adjust the effect so as to eliminate any objection to the 
forfeiture described herein. The intent of this paragraph is permit the Seller to retake 
ownership and possession of the Subject Property for purposes of mitigation and 
certainty without eliminating protection of either party with respect to any remedy 
associated with the damages involved as to the matter. 
9. The provisions of this Agreement shall survive the delivery of the warrant 
deed from Seller. The parties agree to execute a final closing agreement abrogating 
this Agreement with sixty days following the date upon which the Buyer and Seller 
refinance all of the obligations secured by any deed of trust, described above. 
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement this ^ day of 
June, 2001. 
K.D.A. Corporation 
OAJ(\ £ }y>M I*® p* P 
bf. )i *f% g£j5^-<3 //<SW / <£&- & /£. 
its: prU_J^c4 
Pine Ridge Properties, Inc. 
S. Denise Hardy, President ' Joseph L. Hardy , individually 
"~R IAI^SLA^^WCUO^^^'^M 
S. Denise Hardy, individually 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i THIS PLA? .-S MADE 3 0 L £ L > '^r r K : 
1
 PL-fl?OSr Of ASSISTING !N LOCATING 
fHF LAN J, AND THP ~£CO«D£^ AS 
SUME& f'iO LiABlLiTv *OR VARIATION* 
IF ANY. xN\lh AN ACTUAL SURVEY i 
1
 SE I /4 0 "77T~TZ 
finctinn 8 T . 1 4 N R 5 E 
drown bv DE Idate 11-82 
book 
_ _ _ 
i i 1 
scale 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25.20AC. 
0.00 AC. 
s5 
v5 
- 0 3 9 
DEE HILDT a TED HILDT 
20.4)0 AC. 
£-4- 5^6 
5^" REVISIONS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
